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It is always instructive to learn what others see in your book, especially in the
eyes of an expert of the European extreme Right such as Jack Veugelers. He
reads Ces Français qui votent FN as a study in “the social basis of party politics,”
relying on survey data and showing “a predilection for multivariate analysis”
which he obviously does not share. Although he admits that my approach
sheds light on problems such as the double nature of the FN’s constituency,
the decisive influence of gender, or the relation between the votes for Le Pen’s
party and the local presence of immigrants,1 he expresses some doubts about
“the scope and precision” as well as “the reliability” of the book’s methodol-
ogy. I should have gone “beyond data on the social background of voters” and
given more attention to “the party’s organizational activity … partisan identi-
fication and voter flows.” The chapter he prefers is the last one, where “Mayer
suddenly expands her framework to include the leadership, organization and
the legitimacy of far Right parties” and “lends importance to both collective
memories … and the way in which other parties have responded to the far
Right.” On the whole, because they are not “integrated within a comprehen-
sive view of the phenomenon,” my findings fail to answer the “big questions”
one should ask about the FN, such as the reasons for its electoral breakthrough
and endurance, its connections with the former nationalist Rights or its
impact on the French party system and regime. I only partly agree with these
remarks, and therefore gladly accept FPC&S’s proposal to answer them.
My study is not, as Veugelers seems to think, a mere empirical description
of the FN’s social bases; it is integrated in a theoretical frame. To be understood,
the “not so simple act of voting”2 must be placed in what the authors of The
American Voter (1960) called the “funnel of causality,” taking into account all
the factors that shape voter choice from childhood to election day. Issues, par-
ties and leaders matter as much in the process, if not more, than the social
characteristics of the voters. And to understand the choice for a party like the
Front National, that three-quarters of the French voters, including its own,
place at the extreme Right on the left-right scale, one must take into account
the current debate over its nature. Two conflicting hypotheses, not mentioned
in Veugelers’s presentation, structure the book. The first one, argumented by
authors such as Von Beyme, Merkl and Weinberg or Falter, places the FN and
similar European parties developing in Europe in continuity with fascism and
nazism, and explains electoral support for such parties by the classical factors
associated with right-wing extremism: authoritarianism and ethnocentrism,
social isolation, lack of education and “simplism,” socioeconomic depriva-
tion.3 Extremism is thus seen as a “normal pathological condition of our soci-
eties,”4 likely to reappear periodically. The second line of explanation, on the
contrary, stresses the differences between these parties and pre-war fascisms,
seeing them as a “new” and enduring Right sui generis, symmetrical with the
“new” Left, both children of political and ideological changes brought about
by the transition from industrial to post-industrial society.5
The first six chapters of the book explore the right-wing extremism
hypothesis and focus indeed on the characteristics of potential FN voters, mea-
suring to what extent their position on the left-right scale, authoritarianism,
simplism, lack of social and religious ties, working class status, and being a
man, are predictors of a vote for the FN. But the next five chapters link this
vote to what makes the FN different from the previous French extreme Rights,
namely value and issue change, party strategies, and leadership and more gen-
erally the factors on the “supply” side of politics. They show that Le Pen’s
charisma, the growing visibility of his party, and the way it stresses the immi-
gration issue also influence votes, even more than the social characteristics of
the voters or their authoritarianism. 
Now what about the data? Most of the studies devoted to the FN’s voters
are based on commercial opinion polls, drawn from small samples (N=1000),
which are not reliable for the study of such a small group of voters. For not
only are the scores of Le Pen and his party, even at their peak, relatively low,
but a large part of their supporters still refuse to declare such a vote because 
of the moral reprobation attached to it. In the 1997 national elections, for
instance, FN candidates drew just over 15 percent of valid votes, but the aver-
age proportion of self-declared FN voters was approximately 7 percent. This
leaves us, once we take into account the voters who did not go to the polls or
refused to answer (one third of the sample on average), with some 50 FN vot-
ers in the total sample.6 By contrast, the three CEVIPOF surveys I used in my
book, conducted with samples of three to four thousand voters, after the pres-
idential elections of 1988 and 1995 and between the two rounds of the 1997
parliamentary elections, are infinitely more reliable.
Veugelers objects though, rightly, that I thus leave aside other important
elections, those prior to 1988, which allowed the FN’s electoral breakthrough,
and the parliamentary national elections of 1986, 1988 and 1993. However, I
am less interested in the electoral take-off of Le Pen’s party, which has already
been thoroughly studied by authors such as Camus, Birenbaum or Perrineau,7
than in its electoral anchorage, which took place precisely during the period
studied. Moreover, the three elections considered are particularly significant
because they are turning points. First the FN progressed among middle-class
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voters, then among working-class voters. According to SOFRES regular post-
electoral surveys since 1984, the 1988 presidential election marks the peak of
Le Pen’s appeal to shopkeepers and artisans.8 His score rose to 27 percent,
compared with 17 percent in the 1984 European elections and fell again to 14
percent in the 1995 presidential election. Conversely, his influence on the
working-class increased gradually, reaching a record 30 percent in the presi-
dential election of 1995 (compared with 16 percent in 1988 and 8 percent in
1984), a phenomenon that Pascal Perrineau has labeled “gaucho-lepénisme”
because the working-class was the traditional constituency of the Left, and
that I prefer to call “ouvriéro-lepénisme” because the majority of these FN
blue-collar voters are not, or never were, left-wingers.9 By 1997 each of the two
groups gave the same amount of votes to the FN candidates (26 percent among
shopkeepers and 24 percent among the workers).
Veugelers also objects that I move back and forth between presidential
and parliamentary elections, which are “not directly comparable.” Of course
these are elections of different nature: the presidential one is more personal-
ized and far more mobilizing. He is also right to recall that in the 1988 presi-
dential election Le Pen drew four and one-half million votes while in the
following parliamentary elections the party candidates got only two and one-
half million. But that should not mean that one cannot compare them. Grad-
ually, the level of parliamentary voting for the FN has caught up with the
presidential voting for Le Pen, reaching the threshold of 15 percent for the
first time in the 1997 parliamentary elections. It is interesting to check if the
same factors that predict the Le Pen vote of 1988 and 1995 also predict the
1997 FN vote. The answer is yes, partly. A logistic regression using exactly the
same variables for the three surveys shows that the basic ingredients of right-
wing extremism do not change. Regardless of the election, the lack of ties
with the existing parties, affinities with the FN, the level of authoritarianism-
ethnocentrism, gender, and the lack of education are the best predictors of
such a vote. However, there are also changes that reveal a shift among the
party base. Since 1995, social class, religious practice, and political alienation
have also become statistically significant predictors: support for the FN has
risen among voters who belong to the working class, are detached from
Catholicism, and criticize the way democracy functions. The trend continues
in 1997. As a matter of fact, there are more differences between the two presi-
dential elections than between the 1995 presidential and the 1997 parliamen-
tary elections. What could be different, though, in a presidential race, is the
impact of Le Pen’s personality. In 1995, a question about the feeling of sym-
pathy for him, measured on a thermometer graded from zero to one hundred,
shows that although he is the most disliked of French party leaders (45 percent
give him a zero), he attracts more sympathizers than voters, and that sympa-
thy is more predictive than any other variable, even proximity with the FN. 
Veugelers then asserts that “in two areas—the effect of education and the
nature of voter beliefs—Mayer’s interpretations do not fit with her findings.”
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He first questions the existence of a “linear” relationship between education
and support for the FN. Before Lipset, Samuel Stouffer’s book Communism,
Conformity and Civil Liberties10 showed the immunizing effect of education
against prejudice and intolerance. In the same line of thought, I show that in
the three elections studied, the more educated the voter, the less likely he or
she is to vote for the FN and its simplistic anti-immigrant platform, regardless
of sex, class, religion or age. Today in France, the dividing line runs between
those who have the baccalauréat or a higher degree and those who do not. In
the latter group, FN’s scores are roughly twice as high. But the relation is far
from linear. Among the least educated, those who went to technical school are
more likely to agree with the FN’s ethnocentric ideas. This finding can be
explained by the nature of the education they receive, oriented primarily
towards learning a specific skill, and less mind-opening than general studies.
It could, especially among the younger voters, also reflect their frustrations, for
the degrees they will earn are less highly regarded and less likely to give them
job opportunities in a society where without the “bac” there is no future. In
addition, there is another distinct group of voters, the minority who place
themselves on the very far right of the left-right scale. They form a hard core
of convinced and dedicated extreme-right wing leaners, among whom the
probability to vote for the FN, on the contrary, rises with the level of educa-
tion. Thus, the relationship between level of education and voting for Le Pen
or his party is complex, confirming the dual nature of his support. It can be a
sophisticated, ideological, extreme-right FN vote on the one hand, and a sim-
plistic, anti-immigrant, protest vote on the other.
The second area where Veugelers questions my interpretation is the “reac-
tionary”—anti-postmaterialist, anti-permissive and anti-social-libertarian val-
ues—dimension of such a vote and there I do not follow him. He is absolutely
right to point to the differences between the socially and morally conservative
right-wing voters of the FN and the more laxist, irreligious and anticonformist
“ninists.” However, this is exactly what I try to show in chapter 12, about the
“two electorates” of the FN. Socially, politically, and culturally, they belong to
different worlds. One definitely cannot put these voters in the same bag, and
I do not. The “silent counter revolution” theory—the idea that the permissive
values of the 1960s foster a conservative reaction, developed by authors such
as Ignazi—is only halfway true11.
Lastly, he sets apart the final comparative chapter of the book, as if it
were of a different nature: “Mayer suspends the analytical focus and method-
ology that underpin the rest of her book” and some “narrow-minded” people
might even say that she “ought to have driven the nail home by showing that
what applies to France also applies elsewhere.” There again, this is precisely
what I tried to do. Although there was no first-hand comparative data avail-
able, I relied on similar survey research done by Swyngedouw, Billiett, and de
Witte in Belgium, Falter in Germany, and many others. Furthermore, I show
that basically, in most European countries, extreme-right wing parties, con-
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sidered as such, attract the same kind of voters: mostly young, male, unedu-
cated, detached from religion and increasingly working-class. If some of these
parties have taken off electorally and others have not, it is because of their
unequal ability to promote political resources: leadership, party organization,
alliances, and political legitimacy. In 1997, the French FN was among the
champions of the European extreme Rights. It benefited from the charisma of
its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and the strength of the party organization ren-
ovated by its delegate general, Bruno Mégret, from the impact of its clearcut
program, and the divisions of its opponents. Indeed, the recent collapse of
the French Front National, a contrario, confirms this interpretation. The elec-
toral extreme right-wing “potential” is still there, but the split deprived the
party of its resources and thus brought the French extreme Right back to its
level of the 1980’s. Veugelers is right: the social base of party politics does not
explain everything. 
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